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Abstract
We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better in-
formed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both
an observable and unobservable input. We show (1) Performance pay
may not be optimal, even if output is the only informative signal of
an essential input; (2) Total surplus tends to be higher if one input is
unobservable than if both inputs are observable; and (3) Bunching may
arise amongst low and intermediate types. We explore the implications
for push and pull programs used to encourage R&D activity, but our
results have applications beyond this context.
KEYWORDS: Pay for Performance, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection,
Observable Action, Principal-Agent Problem, Grants, Prizes
JEL Classifications: D82, D86, O31
∗A previous working paper was issued under the title, “Push or pull? Grants, prizes, and
information”. We thank Stan Reynolds, Andreas Blume, Asaf Plan, John Wooders, Mar-
tin Dufwenberg, Rabah Amir, Derek Lemoine, Brian Roberson, Junichiro Ishida, Matthew
Mitchell, Tim Flannery, and Dominik Grafenhofer for helpful comments and suggestions.
We also thank participants at the Lancaster University Conference on Auctions, Competi-
tion, Regulation, and Public Policy, The EARIE Annual Conference, The Royal Economics
Society Annual Conference, and the TILEC Conference on Competition, Standardization,
and Innovation.
†Department of Economics, Lancaster University, d.rietzke@lancaster.ac.uk
‡Department of Economics, Nanjing University, chen21@nju.edu.cn
1 Introduction
To what extent should incentives be tied to performance? This question is
relevant in a number of areas, including worker compensation – where it relates
to the debate on salaries vs. piece rates (see, e.g. Lazear, 1986, 2000) – and
innovation incentives, where it pertains to the efficacy of “push” and “pull”
programs (see, e.g., Kremer, 2002). Push programs, such as research grants,
or R&D tax credits, subsidize research input; payments are not contingent on
results. Pull programs, such as innovation prizes, or patent buyouts, directly
tie rewards to research output.
Adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are inherent challenges in
the provision of incentives. Given these problems, Kremer raises the concerns
that push programs may reward researcher’s unlikely to succeed, and provide
weak incentives for unobservable inputs. Indeed, the literature on MH stresses
the importance of performance pay. In the canonical MH model,1 the agent’s
effort is unobservable by the principal, but output, a noisy signal of effort, is
observable. In that model, compensation must be at least partially tied to
output to provide an incentive for greater effort. More generally, Ho¨lmstrom’s
(1979) “informativeness principle” implies that it is valuable for the principal
to condition rewards on any signal – including output – that provides addi-
tional information about the agent’s effort.
Despite these concerns, “low-powered” incentive schemes, in which com-
pensation is weakly, or not at all tied to performance, are commonly used in
practice. In this paper, we offer a new justification for the use of such schemes.
We show that when AS and MH interact, and at least some of the agent’s ac-
tions are observable, performance pay may not be optimal, even if output is
the only informative signal of an essential input.
For concreteness, we present our model in the context of R&D funding, but
our results are relevant in other contexts. We study a principal-agent model
wherein a risk-neutral funder (he; the principal) incentivizes a risk-neutral
researcher (she; the agent) to undertake an R&D project, which may yield a
1See, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983); or Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) ch. 4.
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new technology. The likelihood of success depends on the researcher’s privately
known type, and two essential and complementary inputs – “investment” and
“effort”. Investment is observable by the funder; effort is not.2 If she succeeds,
the researcher earns a profit by marketing the technology, but this incentive,
alone, may be insufficient to elicit R&D activity.3 To ensure the researcher has
an incentive to truthfully reveal the project’s outcome, the funder is subject
to a “free-disposal” constraint, stipulating that the reward for success is no
less than the reward for failure.
The contracts offered by the funder consist of a transfer independent of
performance – a “grant” – and a payment for success – a “prize”. The prize
and grant may depend on investment, but neither can depend on effort. We
show (i) Performance pay may not be optimal; (ii) Total surplus tends to
be higher when effort is unobservable, than when it is observable; and (iii)
Bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types.4
We briefly describe the intuition for our results. (i) The prize creates
a strong incentive for effort, but generates costly information rent for the
researcher due to AS. As a result of this tradeoff, the prize may be zero for all,
or a subset of types. In these cases, the researcher’s compensation is completely
independent of her performance. Effort is induced indirectly, through the
grant. The grant is used to encourage greater investment, which increases
the productivity of effort. The researcher’s product-market profit may then
provide a sufficient incentive for effort.
(ii) If both inputs are observable, then investment is distorted below the
first-best to limit the researcher’s information rent. When effort is unobserv-
able, a larger investment and/or a prize may be necessary to induce effort. But
it is advantageous for the funder to raise investment closer to the first-best.
Doing so increases the researcher’s rent, but increases total surplus, which
2Throughout this analysis, we use the terms “observable”, “contractible”, and “verifi-
able” interchangeably.
3In a more general setting, this incentive might reflect the prospect of a future outside
job opportunity, or some intrinsic motivation.
4Bunching refers to a situation where the principal offers the same contract to multiple
different types.
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partially offsets the additional cost to the funder. A prize, in contrast, simply
transfers surplus from the funder to the researcher. For this reason, investment
and total surplus are (weakly) greater when effort is unobservable than when
it is observable.
(iii) Bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types due to a
tension between rent extraction, effort inducement, and the second-order in-
centive compatibility constraint. As this is a more technical point, we defer a
discussion of this finding to Section 4.4.
The main contributions of our analysis are twofold. First, we add to the
literature on contracting. Following the tradition of the canonical MH model,
most mixed models assume a production process that depends only on unob-
servable actions.5 But this premise is rather extreme. The mental or physical
effort of an agent may be prohibitively costly to monitor, or even quantify. But
investments by a firm in large-scale capital, or the time a worker spends at
work, are quantifiable, and likely easier to verify. We add to this literature by
providing a full characterization of the optimal incentive scheme in a setting
with AS, and inputs that consist of both an observable and unobservable com-
ponent. We show that the partial observability of these inputs has dramatic
consequences for the structure of optimal incentives, and interesting welfare
implications.
If only output is observable then rewards cannot depend on actions(s), and
performance pay is essential. A payment received independent of performance
affects the agent’s overall utility, but will not generate greater marginal incen-
tives. This need not be the case when actions are partially observable. If, for
instance, a researcher’s investment in capital is observable, then rewards can
be directly tied to this input, and greater investment can be encouraged. But
it may be that the researcher’s effort is more productive when she has better
equipment with which to work. If so, then as long as there is some benefit to
success, greater investment increases the marginal returns to effort, and thus,
5Early examples in the literature include Sappington (1982) and Picard (1987). Studies
closer to our analysis include Laffont (1995), Lewis and Sappington (2000a,b) Ollier and
Thomas (2013), and Gottlieb and Moreira (2015). There are, of course, notable exceptions,
which will be discussed in Section 2.
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effort is encouraged without tying rewards to performance.6 This observation
relates closely to findings by Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1991). When the agent
undertakes multiple tasks and efforts are complements, the authors show that
a stronger incentive for effort on one task, simultaneously induces a higher
effort on some other task.
Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom provide an alternative explanation for rewards
independent of performance. Their finding relies on actions being substitutes,7
and the lack of an informative signal associated with some action. Our result
relies on a complementarity between actions, the presence of an observable
action, and the interaction between AS and MH. Additionally, the “fixed wage”
in Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom’s model is a transfer independent of any signal
received by the principal, while the grant depends on the observable action,
but is independent of output. This grant structure better captures the design
of many incentive schemes used in practice. The U.S. R&D tax credit system,
for example, rewards firms independently of performance, but the value of the
credit is directly tied to R&D investment. Similarly, an hourly worker’s wage
may not be contemporaneously tied to performance, but she is only paid for
the time she spends at work.
Meng and Tian (2012) study a multitasking model with AS and MH, and
provide conditions under which lower-powered incentives arise, as compared to
pure MH. We provide conditions under which optimal incentives are completely
independent of performance. When the principal faces a multidimensional AS
problem, Meng and Tian also show that optimal compensation may be inde-
pendent of some performance measures. But their result differs fundamentally
from our’s. In their model the agent undertakes multiple tasks, each of which
contribute to the principal’s payoff. For those tasks where the performance
measures are ignored, the agent exerts no effort. Thus, Meng and Tian’s result
explains why an agent may be lead to specialize on certain tasks. In our model
6In the context of worker compensation, it might be that the (unobservable) mental effort
the worker devotes to her job is more productive when she spends more time at work.
7The so-called “effort substitution problem”. In this case, a stronger incentive for effort
on one task reduces the agent’s effort on the other task. See also Laffont and Tirole (1993,
Ch. 4).
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there is a single task that requires multiple inputs. We show why incentives
might be independent of the outcome of that task, even if this is the only
verifiable signal associated with an essential input.
Our results also shed new light on the welfare implications of AS and MH.
As this literature is quite extensive, we provide only a brief summary here; a
more thorough overview may be found in Laffont and Martimort (2009, Ch.
7). In some models, adding MH creates no further welfare losses, as compared
to pure AS.8 In many other settings, the AS and MH problems exacerbate one
another, leading to greater welfare losses than pure AS or pure MH. Laffont
and Martimort emphasize that this is a quite common feature of models, such
as our’s, where “MH follows AS”.9 Basov and Bardsley (2005) present an
example that follows a similar setup to our model, but without an observable
action. They show that the first-best can be achieved under pure AS or pure
MH, but distortions arise in the combined case.10 In contrast, we show that
there may be welfare gains to adding MH (relative to pure AS) in these models
when actions are partially observable.
Laffont and Martimort discuss another class of models – those where AS
follows MH11 – in which adding MH may improve welfare, relative to pure
AS. In these models, with pure AS distortions arise to limit the agent’s rent.
But when MH is added, it is this rent at the AS stage that motivates greater
effort at the MH stage. So, under AS and MH, the principal may reduce
distortions in order to raise the agent’s rent, and encourage greater effort. In
our model MH follows AS, so it is not the rent captured at the AS stage that
motivates greater effort. Rather, the agent’s optimal effort depends directly on
her investment; to elicit effort under AS and MH, investment is raised closer
to the socially optimal level.
Our second contribution is to the literature on innovation incentives. Many
8See, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1986); Picard (1987); Guesnerie et al. (1989); Caillaud
et al. (1992). Basov and Bardsley (2005) show that independence between the agent’s type,
and the noise in the production function is the basic assumption that lead to these findings.
9That is, the agent learns her type prior to choosing her unobservable action.
10See, also, Lewis and Sappington (2000b) and Gottlieb and Moreira (2015).
11In these models, the agent chooses an unobservable effort that stochastically determines
her privately observed type.
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studies have explored the optimal design of pull programs (e.g., optimal patent
design),12 or compared the performance of different pull programs (e.g., prizes
vs. intellectual property).13 Fewer studies have examined the optimal design
of push programs, or attempted to justify their use, taking MH into account.
Our results are useful in both respects. Further, we connect our results to the
U.S. R&D tax credit system, and comment on its design.
Maurer and Scotchmer (2003) argue that repeated interaction between
grantees and grantors resolves the MH problem. Our explanation for how
a push program might overcome MH complements their’s, as it is relevant
in a static setting. This is important because some push programs, such as
R&D tax credits, do not condition eligibility for rewards based on past perfor-
mance. Fu et al. (2012) show that grants may be useful for facilitating greater
competition in a research contest where researchers have asymmetric capital
endowments. We abstract from the effects of competition, in order to focus
on the role of information.
A number of other explanations for the emergence of low-powered incentive
schemes have been posited in other contexts. Baker (1992) shows that perfor-
mance pay may be muted if output is not contractible, and weakly correlated
with the available performance measure. Baker’s result may be important in
settings where “success” and “failure” are difficult to define. Risk-sharing is
also an important consideration. Pay-for-performance schemes place consid-
erable risk on the agent when outcomes are uncertain. Push programs may
serve as a means of risk sharing.14 We abstract from such considerations, as
both the researcher and funder are risk neutral. Still, in the canonical MH
model, risk aversion, alone, cannot explain the emergence of a push program,
where rewards are independent of performance. Prendergast (2002) shows
that output-based pay may be beneficial if the principal is uncertain of the
“correct” action an agent should take, while input-based pay is more relevant
in less uncertain environments. But Prendergast allows costly monitoring of
12See Hall (2007) for an overview.
13See Maurer and Scotchmer (2003) for an overview.
14See, e.g. Prendergast (1999, 2002) for a more in-depth discussion of risk and incentives.
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effort; we stick closer to the traditional MH paradigm, and assume effort is
prohibitively costly to monitor.
2 Additional Related Literature
Others have examined the role of observable actions in MH models. Zhao
(2008) studies a multitasking model where some actions are observable and
shows, in stark contrast to our findings, that optimal compensation depends
solely on output signals. But in Zhao’s model, efforts and outcomes are inde-
pendent, and the observable actions are not verifiable, which places restrictions
on feasible contracts. In a setup similar to Zhao, Chen (2010) shows that if the
observable actions are verifiable, then optimal compensation depends on both
the observable actions and output signals. Chen (2012) generalizes this find-
ing, allowing multiple agents and complementarities between efforts; Chen’s
results are consistent with our findings in a pure MH setting. Crucially, neither
Zhao nor Chen incorporate AS.
Other models have allowed for AS and both observable and unobservable
actions. For instance, in a large class of models following Laffont and Tirole
(1986), the agent exerts unobservable effort to reduce marginal cost, and then
chooses an observable level of production. But these models are quite distinct
from our setup. First, many of these models involve “false moral hazard” (see
Laffont and Martimort, 2009, ch. 7). Second, in these models, the technology
through which the agent reduces cost depends only on an unobservable action.
It is not until after the MH problem is resolved, that the observable action
is chosen. In our model, the production process depends on both types of
actions, and they are chosen simultaneously. In a quite general framework
with AS and observable/unobservable actions, Caillaud et al. (1992) provide
conditions under which a mechanism can be implemented via a menu of linear
contracts. Meng and Tian’s framework can accommodate observable actions,
but they focus on the case where actions are all unobservable; none of their
results explicitly depend on the existence of an observable action.
Lewis and Sappington (2000b) (henceforth, LS) study an environment with
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AS, MH, and a direct contractible input from the principal. LS’s framework
differs from ours in several important respects. First, in LS there are multiple
agents (at least two).15 Second, each agent in LS’s model faces a wealth con-
straint, which translates to a capital constraint in our model. In particular, if
the agent has zero “wealth”, the grant must reimburse the full cost of invest-
ment. We don’t impose a capital constraint; this is important, as we show that
the optimal grant typically does not fully reimburse investment. Third, our
model explicitly takes into account an incentive outside the principal-agent
relationship that can motivate effort.
3 The Model
3.1 The Primitives
We study a principal-agent model between a funder and a researcher. The
researcher undertakes a single R&D project, which may or may not lead to
the development of a new technology. The inputs are investment, x ∈ R+,
and effort, y ∈ {0, 1}; where, y = 1 indicates working hard and y = 0 denotes
shirking. Investment is observable by the funder; effort is not.
The researcher’s type, θ, is a random variable drawn from a continuous
distribution according to CDF, F , corresponding (smooth) PDF, f , with sup-
port, Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ [0, 1], where θ > θ > 0. The researcher knows the true θ
while the funder knows only its distribution. θ may capture some privately
known characteristic of the project and/or the researcher’s innate ability. Let
h(θ) = 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
denote the inverse hazard rate; assume, for all θ ∈ Θ, h′(θ) < 0
and f(θ) > 0.
Given x, y, and θ, the probability of success is θp(x, y). The function,
p : R2+ → [0, 1], is increasing in each argument, and twice continuously differ-
entiable, with p(0, ·) = p(·, 0) = 0, and for all x, y > 0, p12(x, y) > 0. That
is, investment and effort are both essential for success, and they are comple-
15This provides the principal with an additional instrument that we do not consider;
namely, the probability with which the project is allocated to any one particular agent.
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ments. We let ρ(x) denote p(x, 1), and we may then write, θp(x, y) = θyρ(x).
We assume ρ is strictly increasing, but there are diminishing marginal returns
to investment: ρ′ > 0 and ρ′′ < 0. It is useful to point out that ρ′ contains
some information about the complementarity between x and y. Specifically,
the stronger is the complementarity between x and y, the larger will be ρ′.
If the researcher invests x and chooses effort, y, she incurs a total cost of
x+cy. If the project succeeds she earns a profit in the product market of pi > 0,
and the funder captures a benefit, W > 0. Otherwise both receive nothing.
W might represent, for example, the consumer surplus associated with the
technology. Absent intervention, a type-θ researcher’s expected payoff is,
Π(x, y, θ) = θyρ(x)pi − x− cy.
We let (x(θ), y(θ)) = arg maxx≥0,y∈{0,1}Π(x, y, θ) denote the researcher’s opti-
mal no-intervention investment and effort; and we let Π(θ) = Π(x(θ), y(θ), θ)
denote her maximized profit. We assume throughout that if the researcher
is indifferent between working hard and shirking, she will choose to work; to-
gether with the strict concavity of ρ, this means x(θ) and y(θ) are unique. Note
that pi may or may not provide a sufficient incentive to elicit R&D activity
(i.e., it may be that x(θ), y(θ),Π(θ) > 0 or x(θ) = y(θ) = Π(θ) = 0).
3.2 Feasible Contracts and the Funder’s Problem
The funder designs contracts to motivate greater R&D activity from the re-
searcher. A contract specifies a grant, g ∈ R, a prize, v ∈ R, and an invest-
ment, x ∈ R+. The grant is received by the researcher independent of success
or failure, while the prize is a received only if the project succeeds.16
The outcome of the project is initially observed only by the researcher,
who reports the result to the funder. If she reports success, the outcome is
16Note that g < 0 or v < 0 represent transfers from the researcher to the funder. Further-
more, note that it is without loss of generality that we focus on grants and prizes. In general,
an optimal mechanism will specify a transfer, ts, in the event of success, and a transfer, tf , in
the event of failure. However, as both parties are risk neutral, this is equivalent to specifying
a grant, g ≡ tf , and a prize, v ≡ ts − tf .
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verifiable at zero cost. But, we assume that the researcher may shroud her
success from the funder, if it is in her interest to do so. To avoid creating
this incentive, we follow Innes (1990), and more recently, Poblete and Spulber
(2012), and impose a free-disposal constraint, which requires that the reward
for success is no less than the reward for failure, i.e., v ≥ 0.17
We focus, without loss of generality, on “investment-forcing contracts”,
where the researcher is only eligible for the grant/prize if she follows through
on the agreed-upon investment. Note that if the researcher deviates from the
agreed-upon investment, x′, and instead chooses x 6= x′, and effort, y, then her
payoff is Π(x, y, θ) ≤ Π(θ). So, as long as her payoff when she follows through
on x′ exceeds Π(θ), it is never optimal to deviate from this investment.
By the Revelation Principle, it suffices to consider direct mechanisms. The
funder commits to a menu of contracts, m = {v(θ), g(θ), x(θ)}θ∈Θ, where v :
Θ→ R+ denotes a prize schedule, g : Θ→ R denotes a grant schedule, and x :
Θ→ R+ denotes an investment schedule. Throughout this analysis we restrict
attention to continuous, and piecewise differentiable prize/grant/investment
schedules. The researcher observes the menu, and if she participates, reports
her type, θˆ, to the funder. The funder then specifies an investment level, x(θˆ),
a prize, v(θˆ), and a grant, g(θˆ), according to the menu. If the researcher does
not participate, she earns Π(θ).
After the contract is formed, the researcher chooses investment and effort,
the outcome of the project is realized, and transfers are made accordingly.
For a particular contract, {v, g, x},18 the researcher’s payoff is,
y[θρ(x)(v + pi)− c]− x+ g
Let y∗(v, x, θ) denote the researcher’s optimal effort choice: y∗(v, x, θ) =
arg maxy∈{0,1}{y[θρ(x)(v + pi)− c]− x+ g}. It holds,
17 Note that when the free-disposal constraint is satisfied and the researcher behaves
optimally, the environment is equivalent to one in which the funder may observe the outcome
of the project directly. We therefore do not explicitly model the outcome-report game.
18Where it does not cause confusion, we will liberally abuse notation, and sometimes
let v ∈ R+, g ∈ R, and x ∈ R+ denote particular prize, grant, and investment amounts,
respectively.
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y∗(v, x, θ) = 1 ⇐⇒ θρ(x)(v + pi)− c ≥ 0. (1)
When it is clear, we suppress the arguments of the researcher’s optimal choice
of effort, and simply write y∗. For a given menu, m = {v(θ), g(θ), x(θ)}θ∈Θ,
the payoff to a researcher of type θ who reports θˆ is,
u(θˆ|θ) = θy∗ρ(x(θˆ))[v(θˆ) + pi]− x(θˆ)− cy∗ + g(θˆ).






θy∗ρ(x(θ)) [W − v(θ)]− g(θ)
]
f(θ)dθ
If one interprets W as the consumer surplus associated with the innovation,
then the funder’s payoff can be interpreted as expected consumer surplus, less
the expected cost of funding.19
For a given θ, x, and y, let total (or social) surplus, S(x, y, θ), be defined
as the sum of the researcher’s and funder’s payoffs:
S(x, y, θ) = θyρ(x)(W + pi)− x− cy





S(x(θ), y∗, θ)− u(θ)
]
f(θ)dθ (2)
Equation (2) makes clear that the funder’s payoff is expected total surplus less
the expected payoff of the researcher. The funder’s problem is then,20
19In this R&D context, the funder might also value the profit to the researcher. The
qualitative nature of our conclusions generalize to such an environment, provided there is
some social cost to raising funds, as in Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993), or the funder values
firm profits less than consumer welfare. The important point is that transfers from the
funder to the researcher are costly to the funder.
20Note that y∗(·) is a single-valued function, and so we do not need to include an effort





s.t. for all θ, θˆ ∈ Θ :
u(θ) ≥ Π(θ) (IR)
u(θ) ≥ u(θˆ|θ) (IC)
x(θ) ≥ 0; v(θ) ≥ 0
The first constraint is individual rationality (IR), the second is incentive
compatibility (IC), the third gives the non-negativity constraint on investment,
and the free-disposal constraint.
We will assume throughout that W is sufficiently large such that the funder
would like to induce effort from a researcher of any type. To ensure that this is
optimal for the researcher, using (1), we impose the constraint, θρ(x(θ))(v(θ)+
pi) − c ≥ 0, on the funder’s problem. Under this constraint, it holds that
y∗(v(θ), x(θ), θ) = 1 for all θ. Then, using standard techniques (see, e.g.,
Laffont and Tirole, 1993, pp. 64 and 121), it can be shown that IC is satisfied
if and only if, for all θ ∈ Θ:






= ρ′(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)x′(θ) + ρ(x(θ))v′(θ) ≥ 0 (IC-S)
θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) ≥ c (IC-E)
Where (IC-F) and (IC-S) give, respectively, the first and second order
conditions for the researcher’s type-report problem; (IC-E) ensures that it is
optimal for the researcher to exert effort, when she reports her type truthfully.
As stated, the IC and IR constraints do not rule out the possibility of a
profitable deviation where the researcher misreports her type, and shirks on
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effort. Appendix A shows that the IC and IR constraints provided above are
sufficient to rule out such a profitable deviation if x(θ) ≥ x(θ) or Π(θ) = 0.
In many contexts, it seems reasonable to think that the principal would like
to induce greater activity on the project than what the agent would otherwise
choose. One might expect this to be the case in the context of R&D, since
the social value of an innovation often far exceeds the private value to the
innovator (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2009). In this regard, it is natural to assume





It will be seen that Assumption (A1) is sufficient to ensure that, in equi-
librium, the funder’s desired level of investment exceeds x(·).
Assumption (A1) is also useful for dealing with the possibility of “counter-
vailing incentives”,21 which may arise when the agent’s outside option is type
dependent (as it is in our model). These issues are explored by Lewis and
Sappington (1989),22 but under (A1), the issue does not arise in our model.
The following lemma proves useful in establishing this fact.
Lemma 1. Let {v(θ), g(θ), x(θ)}θ∈Θ satisfy (IC-F), free disposal: v(·) ≥ 0,
and suppose x(θ) ≥ x(θ) for all θ. If u(θ) ≥ Π(θ), then u(θ) ≥ Π(θ) for all θ.
The significance of Lemma 1 is that IC and free-disposal are sufficient to
ensure that IR is satisfied so long as (i) IR is satisfied for the lowest type, and
(ii) the funder desires an investment level greater than what the researcher
would otherwise choose. We will show that when W is sufficiently large, and
(A1) holds, point (ii) is satisfied. So, IR is satisfied if u(θ) ≥ Π(θ) (and IC
is satisfied). In this case, the IR constraint resembles the usual one that is
independent of the agent’s type. Note that as the funder’s payoff is strictly
decreasing in u(·), this IR constraint binds at the optimum: u(θ) = Π(θ).
21Many AS models are structured in such a way that the agent has a systematic incentive
to either under or over report her type. Countervailing incentives refers to a situation where
some types have an incentive to under report, while others have an incentive to over report.
22See also, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000).
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For convenience, we assume Π(θ) = 0; but it is straightforward to generalize
our results to the case where Π(θ) > 0, so long as (A1) is satisfied. Integrating




ρ(x(t))(v(t) + pi)dt (3)
Taking expectations (with respect to θ) over both sides of (3), and integrating







Substituting the expression above into (2), we obtain the following relaxed






θρ(x(θ))[W + pi]− x(θ)− c− ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)h(θ)]f(θ)dθ} [P ]
Subject to (IC-S), (IC-E), x(θ) ≥ 0, and free-disposal, v(θ) ≥ 0.
4 Results
This section provides a full characterization of the optimal funding contracts.
We first study three benchmark settings: complete information, pure MH, and
pure AS. Throughout the analysis we use lower-case letters (x, v, g, etc.) to
denote arbitrary investments, prizes, grants, etc. and upper-case letters (X,
V, G, etc.) to denote optimal solutions. We will say that a funding contract
is a pure grant if v = 0 and g > 0, and we analogously define a pure prize.
23This problem is a relaxation of the funder’s true problem, as it does not fully incorpo-
rate the IR constraint. Moreover, this problem does not explicitly rule out simultaneous
profitable deviations by the researcher in both her type report, and effort choice. But by
Lemma 1 IR is satisfied if the solution to [P ], X(·), satisfies X(·) ≥ x(·). Moreover, as we
assume Π(θ) = 0, the analysis in Appendix A ensures that simultaneous deviations in type
report and effort choice are not profitable.
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We will say that a funding contract is a hybrid if v > 0 and g > 0. Finally,
define a type-θ’s information rent as u(θ) − Π(θ). But note that as her rent
is strictly increasing in u(·) (for a fixed Π(θ)), we will often just refer to u(·)
when discussing the researcher’s rent.
4.1 Complete Information
With complete information, the funder observes the true θ, and investment and
effort are both observable. Given θ ∈ Θ, the funder offers a forcing contract,
m = {v, g, x, y}, stipulating both investment and effort to solve,
max
m
{θyρ(x)(W + pi)− x− cy − u(θ)} s.t.
u(θ) ≥ Π(θ) and v ≥ 0
We let (XFB(θ), YFB(θ)) denote the first-best investment and effort level,
which solve the problem above. Since the funder’s payoff is decreasing in u(θ),
the IR constraint, u(θ) ≥ Π(θ), binds at the optimum. Then, straightforward
maximization yields, for W sufficiently large, YFB(θ) = 1, and XFB(θ) > 0
given by the solution to the following first-order condition:
θρ′(XFB(θ))(W + pi) = 1 (FB)
Note that (XFB(θ), YFB(θ)) maximize total surplus at θ: The LHS of (FB)
is the marginal social gain from investment, while the RHS is the marginal
social cost of investment. Applying the implicit function theorem to (FB), the
concavity of ρ implies X ′FB(θ) > 0.
With complete information, there are many ways the funder can induce the
researcher to take the first-best investment/effort levels. He offers a contract
specifying, XFB(θ) and YFB(θ), and calculates the prize/grant combination,
V (θ) ≥ 0 and G(θ), that leaves the researcher with zero rent:
u(θ) = θρ(XFB(θ))(V (θ) + pi)−XFB(θ)− c+G(θ) = Π(θ)
16
The expression above leaves open the possibility of a pure prize, a pure grant,
or a hybrid scheme.
4.2 Pure Moral Hazard
This section studies the case of pure MH: Assume effort is unobservable by the




{θρ(x)(W + pi)− x− c− u(θ)} s.t.
u(θ) ≥ Π(θ), θρ(x)(v + pi)− c ≥ 0, and v ≥ 0
The distinction between the funder’s problem with pure MH, and and complete-
information, is the (IC-E) constraint: θρ(x)(v + pi) − c ≥ 0, in the problem
above. This reflects the fact that a choice of y = 1 must be optimal for the
researcher. We now show that under pure MH the optimal means of funding
is, in general, a pure prize scheme.
Proposition 1.
In the model with pure MH, there exists an optimal means of funding that
is a pure prize; moreover, the funder attains the first best: X(θ) = XFB(θ),
G(θ) = 0 and V (θ) > 0 satisfies,
u(θ) = θρ(XFB(θ))(V (θ) + pi)−XFB(θ)− c = Π(θ).
Under pure MH, there always exists an optimal means of funding that is
a pure prize scheme. Intuitively, by only rewarding success, the prize creates
a stronger incentive for unobservable effort than does a grant. In fact, the
researcher’s effort choice is completely independent of the grant.
Even so, it is important to emphasize that a grant can be used to en-
courage effort. The key point is that the researcher’s effort depends both on
the prize and on investment. As investment is observable, the funder may
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condition the grant on this variable,24 and in this way, elicit greater invest-
ment. Then, greater investment increases the returns to effort, and through
this complementarity, effort can be encouraged. We stress this point in our
next proposition, which shows that there may be an optimal means of funding
that is a pure grant. Before doing so, we introduce a key piece of notation.
Definition 1. If limx→∞ θρ(x)pi > c, then let xm(θ) satisfy,
θρ(xm(θ))pi = c.
xm(θ) is the smallest investment necessary to induce effort from a researcher of
type θ if the prize is zero. As ρ(·) is strictly increasing, this implies x′m(·) < 0.
We will say that an investment, x, is sufficient to induce effort at θ if x ≥
xm(θ); i.e., if it is optimal for the researcher to exert effort when the prize is
zero: y∗(0, x, θ) = 1.25
For a fixed θ, xm(θ) provides a useful summary of the strength (or severity)
of the MH problem, as well as the complementarity between investment and
effort. If the researcher’s effort cost is high, relative to her product market
profit – i.e., c
pi
is large – then a greater incentive is necessary to induce effort.
When this is the case, we say that the MH problem is more severe. It is
straightforward to show that, for any θ, xm(θ) is strictly increasing in this ratio.
Moreover, if the complementarity between investment and effort is weak, then
the channel through which investment induces effort breaks down, and a higher
investment is needed to induce effort. So, the weaker the complementarity
between the inputs, the higher is xm(·), ceteris paribus.26
The next proposition provides conditions under which a pure grant is op-
timal in the model with pure MH.
24Recall from Section 3 that we focus, WLOG, on a particular form of dependence, wherein
the researcher only receives the grant if she follows through on the agreed upon level of
investment. But in general, there are many ways in which this dependence can be modeled.
25If limx→∞ θρ(x)pi < c, then xm(θ) is not well-defined. In this case, no investment is
sufficient to induce effort, and a prize is necessary to elicit effort.
26Consider two probability of success functions, θp(x, y) and θp˜(x, y). Suppose, p˜12 ≥ p12
for all (x, y). It is straightforward to show that for any θ and x ≥ 0, θρ˜(x) ≥ θρ(x). This
implies xp˜(θ) ≤ xp(θ), where xp˜ corresponds to p˜, and xp corresponds to p.
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Proposition 2.
In the model with pure MH, if the researcher is of type θ, there exists an optimal
means of funding that is a pure grant if and only if xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ).
Through the grant, the funder induces the researcher to invest XFB(θ).
But when XFB(θ) is sufficient to induce effort, the MH problem is overcome,
without the need for a prize. The key condition of Proposition 2 is thus,
xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ).
4.3 Pure Adverse Selection
This section studies pure AS: Assume that both effort and investment are
observable by the funder, but θ is only observed by the researcher. The funder
offers a menu of contracts, m = {v(θ), g(θ), x(θ), y(θ)}θ∈Θ, stipulating both
investment and effort. The funder’s problem is exactly as in [P] (see Section
Section 3), but without (IC-E), since effort is contractible. Our next result
characterizes the optimal funding scheme under pure AS.
Proposition 3. In the model with pure AS, the optimal means of funding is
a pure grant for all types: V (θ) = 0 and G(θ) > 0 for all θ. Moreover,
(1) Investment is distorted below the first-best: For θ < θ, X(θ) < XFB(θ);
but there is “efficiency at the top”: X(θ) = XFB(θ). Specifically, for all
θ, X(θ) satisfies:
θρ′(X(θ))(W + pi) = 1 + h(θ)ρ′(X(θ))pi (4)
(2) The grant only partially reimburses expenditures: G(θ) < X(θ) + c and
0 < G′(θ) < X ′(θ) for all θ.
Proposition 3 shows that a pure grant scheme is optimal under pure AS;
moreover, investment is distorted below the first-best, and the grant partially
reimburses costs. To understand why the optimal prize is zero, consider a two-
type version of the model: Θ = {θ, θ}, where θ > θ. IC dictates, u(θ) ≥ u(θ|θ);
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but, in equilibrium, this constraint binds. Let x and v denote the investment
and prize (respectively) offered to the low type, then one can show,
u(θ) = u(θ|θ) = (θ − θ)ρ(x)(v + pi) > 0 (5)
From (5) it is clear that u(θ) is strictly increasing in v, but it does not
depend on the grant offered to the low type. Intuitively, if the high type
imitates the low type, the high type is more likely to succeed, and therefore
more likely to receive the prize, v, than the low type would be. Therefore, the
expected value of the prize intended for the low type, θρ(x)v, is greater for
the high type than the low type. To prevent under-reporting, the high type
must be offered a rent to compensate her for this fact. A grant, in contrast,
is received independently of success or failure, so its expected value is the
same for both types. For this reason, the prize is a more expensive means of
funding than the grant. As both inputs are observable, the funder induces
effort/investment via the cheaper grant scheme.
Also from (5) it is clear that the high-type’s information rent is increasing in
x. To limit the information rent of higher types, investment is distorted below
the first best for all types below the highest type. The optimal investment
schedule balances the trade-off between rent-extraction and efficiency: The
LHS of (4) is the marginal social benefit of investment; the RHS is the marginal
social cost plus the marginal information rent cost to the funder.
Although this efficiency/rent extraction trade-off is standard in AS models,
we highlight the role played by pi and the free-disposal constraint in our model.
For simplicity, in the discussion that follows, suppose Π(θ) = 0 for all θ. If
we relaxed the free-disposal constraint, or set pi = 0, then the funder could
appropriate all of the researcher’s rent, and attain the first-best by setting
v(·) = −pi, and g(·) = x(·) = XFB(·) (see, e.g., Lewis and Sappington, 2000b;
Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). But pi > 0, combined with free disposal,
implies that the researcher must capture at least pi in the event of success. This
leaves an inappropriable rent for the researcher, and leads to the downward
distortion in investment.
As another consequence of pi > 0 (and free-disposal), Proposition 3 shows
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that the grant offers less than full cost reimbursement (G < X + c), and the
cost borne by the researcher, X+c−G, increases in type (since G′ < X ′). This
structure ensures that, only a researcher that is sufficiently likely to succeed, is
willing to receive a large grant. A grant that fully reimburses investment would
lead the researcher to always behave as if she is of type θ – the type receiving
the greatest investment recommendation – in order to have the greatest chance
of success (and receiving pi).
4.4 Mixed Case: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
We now explore the general case of AS and MH. The funder’s (relaxed) problem
is given by [P] in Section 3. Let XAS(·) and GAS(·) denote the optimal in-
vestment and grant schedules characterized in Proposition 3 under pure AS.27
Recall, that XAS(·) balances the tradeoff between efficiency and rent extrac-
tion. An investment above XAS(θ), or a prize greater than zero, generates
excessively high information rent for the researcher. It is useful to bear in
mind that when MH is also a relevant concern, the funder would like to keep
investment as close as possible to XAS(·), and the prize as small as possible,
subject to the constraint that the researcher exerts effort.
We are now ready to state our main results. It will be seen that the
structure of the optimal scheme under AS and MH depends critically on xm(·).
Proposition 4. If xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ) then the optimal means of funding is a
pure grant for all types: V (θ) = 0 and G(θ) > 0 for all θ. Moreover,
(1) If xm(θ) ≤ XAS(θ), then for all θ: X(θ) = XAS(θ), and G(θ) = GAS(θ).
(2) If XAS(θ) < xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ), then there exists θ′ ∈ (θ, θ) such that
(i) For θ ∈ [θ, θ′] there is bunching: X(θ) = G(θ) = xm(θ).
(ii) For θ ∈ (θ′, θ]: X(θ) = XAS(θ), G(θ) < X(θ) and 0 < G′(θ) <
X ′(θ).





























Figure 1: Investment schedules (in bold) for the cases covered in Proposition 4. Case (1) is
shown in the left panel, and case (2) in the right panel.
Proposition 4 reveals the circumstances in which optimal funding takes the
form of a pure grant scheme, despite the MH problem. The optimal investment
schedules for the two cases covered by Proposition 4 are shown in Figure 1.
Under the hypothesis of Proposition 4(1), XAS(θ) is sufficient to induce
effort at each θ, i.e. xm(θ) ≤ XAS(θ) for all θ. In this case, the MH problem
is completely resolved – without a prize – at no additional cost to the funder.
In the case covered by Proposition 4(2) there is an interval of low types
such that for each θ in this interval, XAS(θ) is not sufficient to induce effort.
For these types, the funder must raise investment above XAS(·), and/or offer a
prize to elicit effort. Either way, greater rent will be generated for higher types.
But there is an advantage to encouraging effort through greater investment. To
see why, consider the problem of encouraging effort from a researcher of type θ.
Under the hypothesis of Proposition 4(2), XFB(θ) is sufficient to induce effort
at θ, i.e., xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ). As total surplus at any θ is strictly increasing in
x for x < XFB(θ), the funder can raise the type-θ’s investment up to xm(θ),
which induces effort and increases total surplus. This increase in total surplus
partially offsets the additional information rent cost to the funder. A prize,
in contrast, does not affect total surplus, but simply transfers surplus from
22
the funder to the researcher. For this reason, effort is encouraged through
increased investment, incentivized by a grant.
The discussion above suggests that whenever XAS(θ) < xm(θ) < XFB(θ)
then it should be optimal for the funder to offer no prize, and specify the
investment, xm(θ), to induce effort. However, xm(·) is strictly decreasing, and
(IC-S) dictates that the investment schedule be non-decreasing when the prize
is zero. Therefore, this investment schedule cannot be implemented over an
interval of types, and bunching arises amongst low types.
The next result shows that if xm(θ) is larger than in Proposition 4, then a
hybrid scheme is used for some types.
Proposition 5. If XFB(θ) < xm(θ) < XFB(θ) then the optimal means of
funding is a hybrid for sufficiently low types, and a pure grant for sufficiently
high types. That is, G(θ) > 0 for all θ. While there is some θ′ ∈ (θ, θ) such
that if θ < θ′ then V (θ) > 0, and if θ ≥ θ′ then V (θ) = 0. Moreover, there
exists θ′′ ∈ (θ′, θ) such that,
(1) For θ ∈ [θ, θ′) investment is equal to the first-best, and is fully reimbursed
by the grant: X(θ) = G(θ) = XFB(θ).
(2) For θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′] there is bunching: X(θ) = G(θ) = XFB(θ′).
(3) For θ ∈ (θ′′, θ]: X(θ) = XAS(θ), 0 < G(θ) < X(θ), and 0 < G′(θ) <
X ′(θ).
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the prize and investment schedules
for the case covered by Proposition 5. We first provide the intuition for the
optimal hybrid scheme in the range of low types, [θ, θ′], given in Part (1).
Under the hypothesis of Proposition 5, there is a range of low types such
that for each type θ in this range, neither XFB(θ), nor XAS(θ), are sufficient
to induce effort, i.e., xm(θ) > XFB(θ) > XAS(θ). Consider the problem of
eliciting effort from the type θ. As in the case of Proposition 4(2), it is feasible
to elicit effort from this type through increased investment (i.e., set v(θ) = 0





























Figure 2: Investment and prize schedules (in bold) for the cases covered in Proposition 5
(left panel) and Proposition 6 (right panel).
beyond first-best, as total surplus at any θ is strictly decreasing in x for x >
XFB(θ). Instead, the funder sets investment equal to the first-best, X(θ) =
XFB(θ), and offers a prize, V (θ) > 0, to induce effort.
To limit the researcher’s rent, the funder would like to keep the prize small.
The smallest prize capable of eliciting effort from all types leaves (IC-E) bind-
ing at each θ: θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) = c. But for (IC-E) to bind over an interval
of types, the term, ρ(x(·))(v(·)+pi), must be strictly decreasing, which violates
(IC-S). As a result, (IC-E) binds only at θ, and whenever V (θ) > 0, (IC-S)
binds. To keep the prize as small as possible, a grant is used to fully offset
the cost of investment. The optimal prize schedule, V (·), is the smallest prize
consistent with IC that is capable of inducing effort from any type.
A researcher of type θ ∈ [θ, θ′] is indifferent between reporting her type
truthfully, or any other θˆ ∈ [θ, θ′]. If, for instance, the researcher over reports,
she receives a larger investment, which increases the likelihood of success, but
she receives a smaller prize. In equilibrium, these two effects exactly offset.
To explain the bunching of intermediate types described in Proposition
5(2), first recall that when v(·) = 0, (IC-S) requires that x(·) is non-decreasing.
Examining Figure 2, it can be seen that for each type θ ∈ (θ′, θ′′), it must hold
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that x(θ) ≥ XFB(θ′) > XAS(θ). For each type in this interval, the funder
would like to reduce investment closer to max{XAS(θ), xm(θ)}, which is not
feasible. Therefore, (IC-S) binds, and bunching arises.
Our final result in this section reveals conditions under which the optimal
means of funding is a hybrid scheme for all types.
Proposition 6. If XFB(θ) ≤ xm(θ) then the optimal means of funding is a
hybrid for all types. Moreover, investment is equal to the first-best, and is
fully reimbursed by the grant: V (θ) > 0 and X(θ) = G(θ) = XFB(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ.28
The intuition for the funding scheme outlined in Proposition 6 is similar to
the intuition behind the hybrid scheme offered to low types in Proposition 5.
The difference here is that the prize required to induce effort from the lowest
type is large enough that, when combined with the bound on the slope of V (·)
provided by (IC-S), the prize is strictly positive for all types.
If one compares the optimal investment schedule under pure AS, XAS(·),
with the optimal investment schedules characterized in Propositions 4-6, it is
clear that for any θ, XAS(θ) ≤ X(θ) ≤ XFB(θ). Thus total surplus is (weakly)
higher at each θ when effort is unobservable, than when it is observable. The
following corollary formalizes this observation.
Corollary 1. When the funder faces an AS problem, equilibrium total sur-
plus is (weakly) higher at each θ when effort is unobservable, than when it is
observable.
As mentioned in the introduction, in mixed models where the agent’s only
action (effort) is unobservable and chosen after learning her type, effort tends
to be distorted below the first-best to a greater extent than under pure AS.
Corollary 1 shows that this is not the case when investment is observable. To
understand the role played by the observable action, note that when actions
are all unobservable, typically, the instruments that overcome MH also gener-
ate significant rent for the agent (due to AS), and do not directly contribute to
28Proposition 6 also applies when limx→∞ θρ(x)pi < c, which means xm(θ) is not well
defined.
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total surplus. For instance, if investment were unobservable in our model then
greater investment/effort must be encouraged through a prize. The prize gen-
erates significant rent for the researcher; to limit these rents, weaker incentives
are provided, as compared to pure AS. In addition, the prize does not con-
tribute to total surplus. As a result, total surplus is distorted further below the
first-best, as compared to pure AS. In contrast, when investment is observable,
it can be incentivized through the grant, and greater effort can be encouraged
through the complementarity between the inputs. The grant is much more
effective in limiting the researcher’s rent, and investment contributes directly
to total surplus.
Let us make one remark as regards Corollary 1. We have assumed through-
out that the funder finds it optimal to elicit effort from a researcher of any
type. This assumption is more stringent in the model with combined AS and
MH than with pure AS.29 If we relax this assumption, the welfare comparison
becomes less clear. Nevertheless, Corollary 1 provides a useful benchmark for
comparing welfare when the social value of the project is sufficiently large.
Finally, Propositions 4 and 5 reveal that bunching may be a prominent
feature of the optimal incentive scheme in our setting. In pure AS models,
bunching is often avoided by assuming a monotone hazard rate (or inverse
hazard rate) on the distribution over types. When bunching is not ruled
out by this distributional assumption, frequently cited reasons for it to occur
are countervailing incentives due to type-dependent outside options (see, e.g.
Lewis and Sappington, 1989; Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1995; Jullien, 2000),
or “non-responsiveness” (see, e.g. Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984).30 In models
that combine AS and MH, bunching may arise for other reasons. Ollier and
Thomas (2013) show that an ex post participation constraint may give rise to
countervailing incentives, and bunching may occur for this reason. Gottlieb
and Moreira (2015) show that bunching is a quite robust feature of binary
29i.e., If we relax this assumption, there may be instances where it is not optimal to elicit
effort from some low types under AS and MH, but where it is optimal to elicit effort from
all types with pure AS.
30Non-responsiveness refers to a situation in which the first-best allocation is not imple-
mentable.
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outcome models with AS, MH and limited liability. In our model, bunching
does not arise for any of the reasons previously described; but rather, it is due
to the conflict between rent extraction, effort inducement, and the second-
order incentive compatibility constraint.
5 Discussion: The Use and Design of Push
Programs
When are push programs useful?
Proposition 4 shows that a pure grant scheme is optimal (for all types) in
our model if xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ). This condition provides insights into the cir-
cumstances that a push program may be useful in practice. In particular, we
conclude that a push program may be more relevant: (1) When AS is an issue;
(2) For a more profitable project (i.e., pi is large); (3) For a researcher with
less valuable alternative endeavors, to which she can devote her time (i.e., the
opportunity cost of effort, c, is small); (4) If there is a strong complementarity
between capital and labor (i.e., p12(x, y) is large); and (5) For a project with
a high social value (i.e., W + pi is large).
Point (1) gives rise to the trade-off between a push and pull program.
When AS is an issue, a pull program, while more effective in motivating un-
observable effort, is a more expensive means of funding than a push program.
Points (2)-(4) imply that the MH problem is not too severe, and that (less eas-
ily observed) labor inputs (effort) can be encouraged through greater capital
investments (which may be easier to verify). The intuition behind point (5)
is the following:31 When MH is a concern, the funder must make the project
worth the researcher’s time. This may be done either through a prize, or if
capital and labor are complements, through greater investment (incentivized
via a grant). For a project with a high social value, the funder is willing to
finance a greater investment, as doing so increases total surplus.
31Mathematically, point (5) holds since XFB(θ) is positively related to both W and pi,
while xm(θ) does not depend on W , and is negatively related to pi.
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These observations may help to shed light on patterns of funding observed
in practice. Let us provide one concrete example. The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation (GF) provides incentives for researchers to undertake projects re-
lated to the development of pharmaceuticals used to treat/prevent certain dis-
eases prevalent in the developing world. McCoy et al. (2009) offer a detailed
report on the funding pattern of GF between 1998-2007. Over this period, it
is reported that GF issued $8.95 billion in grants for global health. Of these
funds, almost 37% were allocated to non governmental or non-profit research
organizations, while less than 1% were awarded to for-profit firms.
Our results may help explain why GF uses a push program, and the distinc-
tion it makes between non-profits and for-profits. First, AS is likely an issue,
as expert researchers probably have better information than GF about the
prospects of drug development. Second, for-profits and non-profits may differ
in their natural motivations to undertake these projects. Due to a number of
market failures, the profitability of these projects is low.32 A for-profit firm, if
motivated primarily by monetary incentives, would have little incentive to de-
vote resources to these projects. A non-profit – setup specifically to undertake
these projects33 – likely has other motivations (perhaps non-monetary). Third,
for-profits and non-profits may differ in the opportunity cost of devoting their
time to these ventures: For-profits likely have other, more profitable ventures
available, while this may be less of an issue for non-profits.34 Finally, these
projects are also of tremendous social value, as health and economic produc-
tivity are intimately linked (see, e.g., Bleakley, 2010). Under these conditions,
our model predicts that a push program may be optimal for motivating a
non-profit, but it is less likely the case for a for-profit.
32See Kremer (2002) and Glennerster et al. (2006) for an overview of the issues
33The Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) is one example of this type
of non-profit (see, http://www.path.org/about/index.php). According to McCoy et al.
(2009), PATH was awarded $949 million in grants from GF between 1998-2007.
34Some of these organizations, such as the Medicines for Malaria Venture, are setup
primarily to conduct R&D related to one particular condition; this organization received
a $115 million grant from GF in 2009 (http://www.mmv.org/newsroom/press-releases/
mmv-receives-115-million-gates-foundation).
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Design of push programs: R&D tax credits and matching grants
Our results also provide insights into the optimal design of push programs. One
such program is the R&D tax credit system in the U.S. The U.S. Congress
estimated that this system cost the federal government $6.9 billion in lost
tax revenue 2013 (Hemel and Ouellette, 2013). In its simplest form, firms
are awarded with a tax credit worth 20% of qualifying expenditures above
some base amount. We show that the pure grant scheme characterized in
Proposition 4(1) bears some semblance to this system.
Proposition 7. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4(1), the optimal funding
scheme can be implemented via a menu of linear contracts, {b(θ), r(θ)}θ∈Θ. For
each θ ∈ Θ, the grant to the researcher takes the form,
G˜(x, θ) =
0 x ≤ b(θ)r(θ)(x− b(θ)) x ≥ b(θ)
where b′(·) > 0, r(·) ∈ (0, 1), r′(·) > 0, and if c is sufficiently small, b(·) > 0.
Proposition 7 reveals that the pure grant scheme can be implemented via
a menu of linear contracts, {b(·), r(·)}, each of which specifies a base amount,
b(θ), and a reimbursement rate, r(θ). If the researcher selects {b(θ), r(θ)},
she is reimbursed nothing for each dollar she invests up to b(θ), and she is
reimbursed at the rate of r(θ) per dollar she invests above b(θ). Higher types
select higher base levels, and receive a greater rate of reimbursement.
Under the current system of R&D tax credits, a firm’s base amount is set
according to past R&D expenditures. The logic is that the government would
only like to reward firms for investment above and beyond what it would
otherwise choose.35 Proposition 7 provides an alternative means to the same
end. Under our system, the researcher is free to choose her base amount, but
she faces a trade-off between the base and the reimbursement rate.
Note that for a given base amount, b, and investment, x > b, the marginal
value of an increase in the reimbursement rate is x− b. Therefore, the greater
35See Hemel and Ouellette for a comprehensive overview of the R&D tax credit system.
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the firm’s investment, the higher is the marginal value of an increase in the
reimbursement rate. For this reason, a particularly productive firm (i.e., a
high θ) that would like to invest more, is willing to accept a higher base, in ex-
change for a higher reimbursement rate. In contrast to the current system, our
system contemporaneously links the base amount to the firm’s desired invest-
ment (rather than relying on past behavior), and provides stronger marginal
incentives to more productive firms.
As mentioned in the introduction, one concern with the use of push pro-
grams is that they may pay for research that is unlikely to succeed. Propo-
sitions 3 and 4(1) shed light on this very issue. An important feature of the
optimal funding scheme in these cases is that, while higher types receive larger
grants, they are expected to bear a greater cost. In this way, only a researcher
that is sufficiently likely to succeed is willing to receive a large grant. This
feature of the funding scheme resembles a matching grant, which requires ex-
penditures from the recipient in excess of the grant. Matching grants, and
other cost-sharing programs, are commonly used by federal agencies in the
U.S.36 Our results suggest that such schemes may be particularly effective in
dealing with AS.
Maurer and Scotchmer (2003) also point out that a matching grant can
be an effective screening device in the presence of AS. Our results reveal the
conditions under which this is in fact the optimal means of screening in a
setting where MH is also relevant. Cost sharing policies have been advocated
in other contexts for dealing with AS and MH. Laffont and Tirole (1986),
for example, emphasize cost sharing as a way to elicit greater greater effort
devoted to cost reduction, while still limiting the firm’s rent.
Capital constraints
One potentially important consideration for the form of funding, from which
our model abstracts, is a capital constraint. Some push programs, such as
research grants, provide upfront funding. It might be argued that this is nec-
36See http://www.grants.gov for a comprehensive list of matching grants currently of-
fered by federal agencies.
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essary when the researcher has limited access to capital. As Scotchmer (2004,
Ch. 8) also points out, this explanation is not satisfactory, as an appropriately
designed pull program should be capable of attracting funding from financiers.
Indeed, this is precisely the logic behind the “Pay for Success” model run by
the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).37 It is also worth pointing out that other
push programs, such as R&D tax credits, do not provide funding upfront.
Even so, while we do not include a capital constraint, our results may be
useful for understanding the issue. Rather than an explicit inability to raise
capital, one could alternatively imagine settings where (1) the socially-optimal
level of investment is large; (2) the researcher has a strong incentive to devote
her time and energy to a project; but (3) is unwilling to raise the necessary
capital, given her costs and benefits. In our model, this translates to a setting
where XFB is large,
c
pi
is small, but the marginal cost of investment (normalized
to 1) is large, relative to pi. While a pull program could be used to encourage
greater investment, our results imply that a push program may be optimal
under these conditions.
6 Comparative Statics
This section compares the performance of grant and prize based funding when
the strength of the MH problem increases. We then explore the relationship
between the profitability of the project, and the optimal funding scheme.
From our results in Section 4.4, one may be tempted to draw the general
conclusion that as the strength of the MH problem increases, a prize becomes
37According to DOL (https://www.doleta.gov/workforce_innovation/success.
cfm):
Under the Pay for Success model, a government agency commits funds to pay
for a specific outcome that is achieved within a given timeframe. The financial
capital to cover the operating costs of achieving the outcome is provided by
independent investors. In return for accepting the risks of funding the project,
the investors may expect a return on their investment if the project is success-
ful; however, payment of the committed funds by the government agency is
contingent on the validated achievement of results.
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a relatively more attractive means of funding. As it happens, this conclusion
is not precisely accurate in the context of our model. In fact, when the MH
problem is weak, an increase in its severity (as measured by an increase in c)
renders prizes, in some sense, less attractive to the funder.
In order to facilitate a comparison of grant and prize-based funding, sup-
pose that the funder, for whatever reason, uses a pure prize scheme (i.e.
g(·) ≡ 0). Let φp(c) denote the funder’s optimal payoff when he encourages
R&D activity using a pure prize, when the cost of effort is c. Let φg(c) denote
the funder’s optimal payoff when he uses a pure grant scheme (i.e. v(·) ≡ 0).
Let D(c) ≡ φg(c) − φp(c) denote the difference between the funder’s optimal






For our next result, we assume that h˜′(·) < 0. Similar to the decreasing inverse
hazard rate condition, this condition ensures full separation of types when the
funder offers only a prize. This assumption is satisfied, for example, by a
uniform distribution. We also assume that the researcher’s outside option is
zero for each type: Π(θ) = 0 for all θ. Neither of these assumptions is necessary
for the next result, but we impose them for ease of exposition.
Proposition 8. Assume h˜′(·) < 0, and Π(θ) = 0 for all θ. Under the hypothe-
ses of Proposition 4(1), the difference between the funder’s optimal pure-grant
and pure-prize payoffs, D(·), is strictly positive, and strictly increasing in c.
Proposition 8 shows that, in some sense, when the MH problem is weak,
pure grant funding becomes relatively more attractive as the strength of the
MH problem increases. To convey the intuition, suppose the effort cost in-
creases slightly from c′ to c′′ = c′ + ∆, but assume the hypotheses of Proposi-
tion 4(1) are satisfied, for both costs. By Proposition 4(1), it follows that the
optimal means of funding is the pure-grant scheme. Thus, D(·) > 0.
If the funder uses a pure grant, then following increase in c, the grant of
the lowest type must increase by ∆ in order to maintain IR. To maintain IC,
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the grant then increases by ∆ for each type θ > θ. Optimal investment, and
the slope of the grant schedule, are unchanged. So following the cost increase,
the researcher’s rent is unchanged, and the the funder’s payoff decreases by ∆.
If the funder uses a pure-prize, the expected value of the prize offered to the
lowest type increases by ∆ to maintain IR. However, when the prize offered to
the lowest type increases, this creates a stronger incentive for higher types to
underreport, and generates a greater rent for these types. To maintain IC, the
expected value of the prize offered to all higher types increases by more than ∆.
That is, the slope of the prize schedule increases. Therefore, the researcher’s
expected rent increases, and the funder’s payoff decreases by more than ∆.
We now explore the comparative statics with respect to the profitability
of the project, pi. Since the optimal investment schedule under AS and MH
is closely related to XAS(·) and XFB(·), we provide our comparative statics
results with respect to these two functions. In what follows, we let φ∗ denote
the funder’s ex-ante equilibrium expected payoff.
Proposition 9.










An increase in pi increases the total surplus generated in the event of suc-
cess, and so it is intuitive that XFB(θ) is strictly increasing in pi. But there
are two competing forces acting on XAS(θ): On the one hand, the funder may
want to increase XAS(θ) due to the increase in total surplus generated in the
event of success. On the other hand, an increase in pi increases the marginal
cost of investment to the funder, due to the increased cost of maintaining IC.38
When θ > h(θ), the total surplus effect dominates the IC effect, and XAS(θ)
increases in pi (vice-versa when θ < h(θ)). Since θ > 0 = h(θ), investment
38See discussion following Proposition 3
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increases in pi for sufficiently high types. Finally, part (iii) of Proposition 9
reveals that the funder is always better off (on average) when pi increases.
Interestingly, the researcher’s equilibrium payoff may be either positively or
negatively related to pi. The fact that the researcher’s payoff may be decreasing
in the profitability of the project seems somewhat counterintuitive. To convey
the idea, first note that the rent of a type-θ researcher is positively related
to both pi, and the investment of types just below θ. When an increase in pi
leads the funder to reduce investment of some low types, the reduction in the
researcher’s available rent may outweigh the gain in the available rent caused
by the increase in pi. The following example illustrates; for the purposes of the
example, we abstract away from MH, and set c = 0.





sition 4, V (θ) = 0, X(θ) = log(θ(W + pi) − h(θ)pi), where h(θ) = 1 − θ.
To calculate the researcher’s equilibrium payoff, u∗(θ), we plug X(·) into (3).
Suppose W = 6 and consider a slight increase in pi from pi = 1 to pi = 1.05.
Following the increase in pi, the equilibrium investment and payoff of a type
just above θ both decrease. For a researcher of type θ = .26, for example, X(θ)
decreases from about .07696 to .05449 and u∗(θ) decreases from about .00038
to .00015. The equilibrium investment and payoff of a high type both increase
following the increase in pi. Setting θ = .8, for example, X(θ) increases from
about 1.6864 to 1.69194 and u∗(θ) increases from about .3392 to .35489.
One may also wonder whether more profitable projects should receive
smaller or greater rewards from the funder. When V (θ) > 0, it holds, G(θ) =




pi. Following an increase in pi, XFB(θ) increases, so V (θ) decreases, and G(θ)
increases.
When the funder uses a pure grant scheme, the impact of a change in pi on
the grant is unclear. To simplify the following discussion, assume that Π(θ) = 0
for all θ, so IR just requires u(θ) ≥ 0. The grant serves two purposes: It is
necessary to satisfy IR, and it is used to reward higher types with information
rent (to maintain IC). Following an increase in pi, there are two competing
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forces on the grant related to IR. There is a direct effect: The project becomes
more profitable, and hence, a smaller grant is required to ensure participation.
But there is also an indirect effect: An increase in pi may lead the funder to
either increase or decrease investment (by Proposition 9(ii)). Ceteris paribus,
an increase (decrease) in investment means a larger (smaller) grant is necessary
to satisfy IR.
Similarly, following an increase in pi there is a direct effect on IC: Ceteris
paribus, an increase in pi generates greater information rent for the researcher,
and a larger grant is used to maintain IC. But there is also an indirect effect
since investment around some θ may increase or decrease. All else equal, an
increase (decrease) in investment for types just below θ, increases (decreases)
the rent of the type θ, and increases (decreases) the size of the grant necessary
to maintain IC. The net effect of a change in pi on the grant depends on the
balance of these forces and is, in general, ambiguous.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we fully characterized the optimal contracts in a setting where
the inputs to production consist of both an observable and unobservable com-
ponent, and the agent holds private information regarding the prospects of the
project. We provided conditions under which pay-for-performance may not be
optimal, and used our findings to shed light on push programs used in practice
to encourage R&D. Although we focus on policy implications related to R&D
funding, our model is useful for understanding the emergence of low-powered
incentive schemes in many other contexts, e.g., worker compensation.
In addition, we provided a novel explanation for the emergence of bunching
in contracts, and shed new light on the welfare implications of AS and MH.
In particular, we showed that when AS and MH interact, total surplus tends
to be higher than in a pure AS setting, which contrasts the typical finding in
models where the agent’s action is chosen after learning her type.
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Appendices
A Further Analysis of IC
In this appendix, we show that under free-disposal, and the IR/IC constraints
given in Section 3.2, it is never optimal for the researcher to choose zero effort
when Π(θ) = 0 or x(θ) ≥ x(θ). Regardless of her type, if the researcher
reports θ and shirks on effort, the project fails with certainty and her payoff
is g(θ) − x(θ). So, if x(θ) ≥ g(θ) for all θ, then the researcher’s payoff if she
shirks on effort is non-positive, and IR would ensure that this is suboptimal.
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First, we will show x(θ) ≥ g(θ) if Π(θ) = 0 or x(θ) ≥ x(θ). We then show
x′(θ) ≥ g′(θ) for all θ. Initially, suppose Π(θ) = 0. Then, u(θ) = Π(θ) = 0
means,
x(θ)− g(θ) = θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)− c (6)
By (IC-E) the RHS of (6) is non negative, and hence x(θ) ≥ g(θ). Next,
suppose Π(θ) > 0 and x(θ) ≥ x(θ). It must be that y(θ) = 1, and x(θ) > 0.
After some re-arranging and simplification, u(θ) = Π(θ) means,
x(θ)− g(θ) = θ[ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)− ρ(x(θ))pi] + x(θ)
Since x(θ) ≥ x(θ) (by assumption), and v(θ) ≥ 0 (by free-disposal), the
term in square brackets is non-negative. Thus, the RHS of the expression
above is strictly positive. This establishes that x(θ) ≥ g(θ) if Π(θ) = 0 or
x(θ) ≥ x(θ). Next, we show x′(θ) ≥ g′(θ) for all θ. Fix θ ∈ Θ. Using the
definition of u(θ), (IC-F) can be written:
x′(θ)− g′(θ) = θ [ρ′(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)x′(θ) + ρ(x(θ))v′(θ)] (7)
By (IC-S) the RHS of (7) is non-negative, and hence x′(θ) ≥ g′(θ); combined
with x(θ) ≥ g(θ) this means that for each θ ∈ Θ, x(θ) ≥ g(θ).
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
By assumption, u(θ) ≥ Π(θ); so, the result follows if u′(θ) ≥ Π′(θ) for all
θ. Fix θ ∈ Θ. (IC-F) implies, u′(θ) = ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi). By the envelope
theorem, Π
′
(θ) = y(θ)ρ(x(θ))pi ≤ ρ(x(θ))pi. But since v(θ) ≥ 0, x(θ) ≥ x(θ),
and ρ is strictly increasing, it holds, ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) ≥ ρ(x(θ))pi. Hence,
u′(θ) ≥ Π′(θ).
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Proof of Proposition 1
Set X = XFB(θ), G = 0, and let V satisfy θρ(X)V = Π(θ) − Π(X, 1, θ). As
XFB(θ) > x(θ), it holds that Π(θ) − Π(X, 1, θ) > 0; hence V > 0. Note,
moreover, that θρ(X)(V + pi) − c = X > 0, which ensures y∗(V,X, θ) = 1.
Finally, by construction, u(θ) = Π(θ), so IR is satisfied. This contract induces
the first-best investment/effort levels, and sets u(θ) = Π(θ). Therefore, the
funder’s payoff is equal to the first-best payoff, and the specified contract is
an optimal contract.
Proof of Proposition 2
Set X = XFB(θ), and V = 0. Let G = Π(θ) − Π(X, 1, θ) > 0. Then, see
that y∗(0, X, θ) = 1 if and only if XFB(θ) ≥ xm(θ). So, this contract satisfies
IR (by construction), and induces the first-best investment/effort levels if and
only if XFB(θ) ≥ xm(θ).
Proof of Proposition 3






θρ(x(θ))[W + pi]− x(θ)− c− ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)h(θ)]f(θ)dθ}
Subject to (IC-S) and v ≥ 0. As explained in Section 3 (see footnote 23),
the problem above is a relaxation of the funder’s problem, as we have not
fully incorporated IR, or ruled out the possibility of simultaneous profitable
deviations in both type and effort. However, as the problem incorporates (IC-
F), and sets u(θ) = Π(θ), by Lemma 1, IR is satisfied so long as X(θ) ≥ x(θ)
for all θ. We show that this is the case under (A1). Note, moreover, that by the
analysis in Appendix A, shirking on effort is not profitable for the researcher,
regardless of her type report, since Π(θ) = 0.
For the moment, we further relax the problem above and ignore (IC-S);
we will then verify that it is satisfied. Examining the funder’s objective, it
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is clear that his payoff is strictly decreasing in v(·). Therefore, for all types,
the funder sets V (θ) = 0. Setting V (θ) = 0, pointwise maximization of the
maximand of the funder’s problem with respect to x, yields the pointwise
first-order condition,
θρ′(X(θ))(W + pi)− 1− ρ′(X(θ))pih(θ) = 0 (8)
Fix θ < θ. Since h(θ) > 0, (8) implies θρ(X(θ))(W + pi) − 1 > 0; by
concavity of ρ, and the definition of XFB(θ), this means X(θ) < XFB(θ).
Moreover, since h(θ) = 0, (8) implies X(θ) = XFB(θ).
We now show that X(θ) ≥ x(θ), for all θ. Fix θ ∈ Θ. Clearly, X(θ) > x(θ)
if x(θ) = 0. So, suppose x(θ) > 0. In this case, x(θ) is the unique solution to
the first-order condition, θρ′(x(θ))pi − 1 = 0. Re-arranging (8), we may write:
θρ′(X(θ))pi − 1 = ρ′(X(θ))[pih(θ)− θW ] < 0 (9)
Where the inequality follows by (A1). Hence, θρ′(X(θ))pi − 1 < 0. Concavity
of ρ and the definition of x(θ) imply, X(θ) > x(θ).
Next, we show that (IC-S) is satisfied. When V (θ) = 0 for all θ, (IC-
S) simply requires X ′(θ) ≥ 0. Differentiating (8) with respect to θ and re-
arranging yields,
X ′(θ) = − ρ
′(X(θ))
[
W + pi − pih′(θ)]
ρ′′(X(θ))
[
θ(W + pi)− pih(θ)]
As ρ′(·) > 0 and h′(·) < 0 (by assumption), the numerator is strictly
positive. Moreover, since ρ′′ < 0, and since (A1) implies θ(W +pi)−pih(θ) > 0,
the denominator is strictly negative. Hence, X ′(·) > 0 and (IC-S) is satisfied.
This establishes part (1). To establish part (2), note that equation (6) in
Appendix A implies X(θ) + c − G(θ) > 0. Next, fix θ. Since V (θ) = 0
equation (7) can be written,
G′(θ) = X ′(θ) [1− θρ′(X(θ))pi] > 0
The inequality above holds since X ′(θ) > 0, and by (9) the term in square
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brackets on the RHS is strictly positive. Moreover, the term in square brackets
is also clearly less than 1; this means G′(θ) < X ′(θ). This establishes the
proposition. Note that equations (6) and (7) provide a full characterization of
the optimal grant schedule.
Proof of Propositions 4 - 6
In this section, we provide proofs of Propositions 4-6. First, we state and prove
the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. (IC-S) and (IC-E) imply that for all θ ∈ Θ, v(θ) ≥ c
θρ(x(θ))
− pi.
Proof. Evaluating (IC-E) at θ yields, θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) ≥ c. But (IC-S)
implies ρ(x(·))(v(·) + pi) is non-decreasing, and this means, for each θ ≥ θ,
θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) ≥ c. Re-arranging this expression yields the desired result.
We now derive properties of the solution to a relaxed problem through a
series of lemmas. We then show that the solution to the relaxed problem solves
[P ]. Recall, however, that [P ] itself is a relaxation of the funder’s problem.
To ensure IR is satisfied, we must still check that the solution to [P ] satisfies,
X(θ) ≥ x(θ) (see footnote 23 and the proof of Proposition 3). But see that
each investment schedule given in Propositions 4-6 has the property that, for
all θ, X(θ) ≥ XAS(θ) > x(θ), where the final inequality is shown in the proof of
Proposition 3. Thus, once we establish that the solutions given in Propositions
4-6, solve [P ], we know that IR is satisfied.






θρ(x(θ))[W + pi]− x(θ)− c− ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)h(θ)]f(θ)dθ} [P ′]
s.t.




(ii) v(θ) ≥ 0
[P ′] is a relaxation of [P ] since by Lemma B.1, (i) is implied by (IC-S) and
(IC-E). To establish that the solution to [P ′] also solves [P ], we must only
check that (IC-S) is satisfied at the solution to [P ′]; (IC-E) is implied by (i).
Setup the Lagrangian for the problem [P ′]:
L =
{





θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)− c
]
f(θ) + µ2(θ)v(θ)f(θ)
Where µ1 and µ2 are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints given in (i)




= −ρ(X(θ))h(θ) + µ1(θ)θρ(X(θ)) + µ2(θ) = 0 (10)
∂L
∂x
= θρ′(X(θ))(W + pi)− 1− ρ′(X(θ))(V (θ) + pi)(h(θ)− µ1(θ)θ = 0 (11)
And the complementary slackness conditions:
µ1(θ)
[
θρ(X(θ))(V (θ) + pi)− c
]
= 0; µ1(θ) ≥ 0; θρ(X(θ))(V (θ) + pi)− c ≥ 0
(12)
µ2(θ)V (θ) = 0; µ2(θ) ≥ 0; V (θ) ≥ 0 (13)
Lemma B.2. At the solution to [P ′]: If V (θ) > 0 then V (θ) = c
θρ(X(θ))
− pi,
and X(θ) = XFB(θ). Moreover, if for some θ˜ ∈ Θ, θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≥ c then
V (θ) = 0 for all θ ≥ θ˜.
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. Plugging µ1(θ) =
h(θ)
θ
into (12) yields, V (θ) = c
θρ(X(θ))
−
pi. Then, plugging µ1(θ) =
h(θ)
θ
and V (θ) = c
θρ(X(θ))
− pi into (11) yields,
θρ′(X(θ))(W + pi)− 1 = 0 ⇐⇒ X(θ) = XFB(θ).
By (13), V (θ) ≥ 0. We have shown that if V (θ) > 0 then V (θ) =
c
θρ(X(θ))
− pi. So, if there exists θ˜ such that c
θρ(XFB(θ˜))
− pi ≤ 0 (equivalently,
θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≥ c), then it must be that V (θ˜) = 0. Since XFB(·) is strictly
increasing, for any θ > θ˜: c
θρ(XFB(θ˜))
− pi ≤ 0 =⇒ c
θρ(XFB(θ))
− pi < 0 =⇒
V (θ) = 0.
Lemma B.3. At the solution to [P ′]: If θρ(XAS(θ˜))pi ≥ c for some θ˜ ∈ Θ
then for any θ > θ˜: V (θ) = 0, µ1(θ) = 0, and X(θ) = XAS(θ).
Proof. Suppose θρ(XAS(θ˜))pi ≥ c for some θ˜ ∈ Θ. Then since XFB(·) ≥ XAS(·)
this means θρ(XAS(θ˜))pi ≥ c =⇒ θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≥ c, and by Lemma B.2,
V (θ) = 0 for all θ ≥ θ˜.
Next, we show θ > θ˜ =⇒ µ1(θ) = 0. Contrary to the proposition, suppose
there exists a non-empty interval I ⊂ (θ˜, θ] such that θ ∈ I =⇒ µ1(θ) > 0.
Fix θ ∈ I. By (12), θρ(X(θ))pi = c, which means X(θ) = xm(θ). Plugging
V (θ) = 0 and X(θ) = xm(θ) into (11) yields,
θρ′(xm(θ))(W + pi)− 1− ρ′(xm(θ))pih(θ) = −µ1(θ)θ < 0.
By concavity of ρ, the expression above implies xm(θ) > XAS(θ), which implies
θρ(xm(θ))pi > θρ(XAS(θ))pi > c, which contradicts the definition of xm(θ).
Note that the final inequality holds since XAS(·) is strictly increasing, θ > θ˜,
and by assumption, θρ(XAS(θ˜))pi ≥ c. So, it must be that µ1(θ) = 0. Plugging
µ1(θ) = V (θ) = 0 into (11) yields θρ
′(X(θ))(W + pi) − 1 − ρ′(X(θ))h(θ)pi =
0 ⇐⇒ X(θ) = XAS(θ).
Lemma B.4. At the solution to [P ′]: If for some θ˜ ∈ Θ, θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≤ c,
then for all θ < θ˜: µ1(θ) > 0, V (θ) =
c
θρ(X(θ))
− pi > 0, and X(θ) = XFB(θ).
Proof. Suppose there exists θ˜ such that, θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≤ c. We first show
that µ1(θ) > 0 for θ < θ˜. Contrary to the proposition, suppose there exists a
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non-empty interval I ⊂ [θ, θ˜) such that θ ∈ I =⇒ µ1(θ) = 0. Fix θ ∈ I. By
(10): µ2(θ) = ρ(X(θ))h(θ) > 0 =⇒ V (θ) = 0. Plugging V (θ) = µ1(θ) = 0
into (11) yields X(θ) = XAS(θ). But since XAS(θ) < XFB(θ˜) this means
θρ(XAS(θ))pi < θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≤ c, which violates (12). Thus, µ1(θ) > 0 for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ˜).
To complete the proof, Lemma B.2 implies that it is sufficient to show
V (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). Suppose to the contrary there exists a non-
empty interval I ⊂ [θ, θ˜) such that θ ∈ I =⇒ V (θ) = 0. Fix θ ∈ I. We’ve
already established µ1(θ) > 0, and so (12) implies θρ(X(θ))pi = c, which means
X(θ) = xm(θ). By assumption, θρ(XFB(θ˜))pi ≤ c ⇐⇒ xm(θ) ≥ XFB(θ˜).
Since θ < θ˜ and XFB(·) is strictly increasing, we have the following string of
inequalities:
xm(θ) ≥ XFB(θ˜) > XFB(θ) (14)
Since µ2(θ) ≥ 0, (10) implies h(θ)− µ1(θ)θ ≥ 0. It then follows from (11):
θρ′(xm(θ))(W + pi)− 1 = ρ′(xm(θ))(V (θ) + pi)(h(θ)− µ1(θ)θ) ≥ 0
By concavity of ρ, the expression above implies xm(θ) ≤ XFB(θ), which con-
tradicts (14). Thus, V (θ) > 0 for θ ∈ [θ, θ˜).
We are now ready to prove Propositions 4-6.
Proof of Proposition 4(1).
As an immediate consequence of Lemma B.3, the investment/prize schedules
given in the proposition solve the problem [P ′]. To establish that the solution
to [P ′] also solves [P ], we must show (IC-S) is satisfied. Note that as V (θ) = 0
and X ′AS(·) > 0, (IC-S) is satisfied. To establish the stated properties of the
grant schedule, we refer the reader to the proof of Proposition 3, as the proof
here is nearly identical.
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Proof of Proposition 4(2).
We first show that the solution given in the proposition solves the relaxed
problem, [P ′]. By assumption, XFB(θ) > xm(θ), which means θρ(XFB(θ))pi >
c and so Lemma B.2 implies V (θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Equation (12) then
implies X(θ) ≥ xm(θ).
Next, the hypotheses of the proposition implies XAS(θ) < xm(θ) < XAS(θ);
by continuity of XAS(·), there exists θ′ ∈ (θ, θ) such that XAS(θ′) = xm(θ). Fix
θ ∈ [θ, θ′). As already shown, V (θ) = 0; if it were the case that µ1(θ) = 0 then
(11) implies X(θ) = XAS(θ). However, since XAS(θ) < xm(θ) this contradicts
(12). So, it must be that µ1(θ) > 0, and hence θρ(X(θ))pi = c ⇐⇒ X(θ) =
xm(θ). Finally, at θ
′ we have θρ(XAS(θ′))pi = c, and so by Lemma B.3, X(θ) =
XAS(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ′, θ].
This establishes that the investment/prize schedules given in the proposi-
tion solve the problem [P ′]. It remains to be shown that these schedules also
solve [P ], and that the grant schedule satisfies the stated properties. These
proofs follow along similar lines as the proof of Cases ii and iii in the proof of
Proposition 5 (Part II), and so we omit these here.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Part I. We first show that the solution given in the proposition solves the
relaxed problem, [P ′]. Since XFB(θ) < xm(θ) < XFB(θ) (by assumption),
continuity of XFB(·) implies that there exists θ′ ∈ (θ, θ) such that XFB(θ′) =
xm(θ); equivalently, θρ(XFB(θ
′))pi = c. Lemma B.4 implies that for all θ ∈
[θ, θ′), V (θ) = c
θρ(X(θ))
− pi > 0 and X(θ) = XFB(θ). Moreover, Lemma B.2
implies that for all θ ∈ (θ′, θ], V (θ) = 0.
Next, since XAS(θ
′) < XFB(θ′) = xm(θ) and XAS(θ) = XFB(θ) > xm(θ)
continuity of XAS implies XAS(θ
′′) = xm(θ) for some θ′′ ∈ (θ′, θ); equivalently,
θρ(XAS(θ
′′))pi = c. Lemma B.3 then implies X(θ) = XAS(θ) for θ ∈ (θ′′, θ].
It remains to be shown that X(θ) = xm(θ) for θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′]. Contrary to the
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proposition, suppose there exists a nonempty interval, I ⊂ [θ′, θ′′] such that
θ ∈ I =⇒ X(θ) 6= xm(θ). Fix θ ∈ I. Since V (θ) = 0 and X(θ) 6= xm(θ), (12)
implies X(θ) > xm(θ), and µ1(θ) = 0. We then have the following string of
inequalities:
X(θ) > xm(θ) = XFB(θ
′) > XFB(θ) > XAS(θ) (15)
Plugging µ1(θ) = 0 into (11) yields X(θ) = XAS(θ), which contradicts (15).
Hence, X(θ) = xm(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′]. This establishes that the solution
given in the proposition solves [P ′].
Part II. To complete the proof of Proposition 5, we show that the investment
and grant schedules have the stated properties. We must also show that the
solution to [P ′] solves [P ]; to do so, we must show that (IC-S) is satisfied. We
will proceed in three cases.
Case i: θ ∈ [θ, θ′)
In this range, the solution to [P ′] yields: X(θ) = XFB(θ) and V (θ) =
c
θρ(X(θ))
− pi. It can be verified that,
ρ′(X(θ))(V (θ) + pi)X ′(θ) + ρ(X(θ))V ′(θ) = 0
And hence (IC-S) is satisfied. It can also be verified that the solution to [P ′]
















Case ii: θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′]
In this range, the solution to [P ′] yields a constant investment and prize
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schedule: X(θ) = xm(θ) and V (θ) = 0; so clearly (IC-S) is satisfied. It may





, and a similar string of inequalities as
presented in Case 1 reveals G(θ) = X(θ).
Case iii: θ ∈ (θ′′, θ]
In this range the solution to [P ′] yields the investment and prize schedules:
X(·) = XAS(·) and V (·) = 0. When V ′(θ) = 0, (IC-S) holds if and only if X























ρ(X(t))pi dt− θρ(X(θ))pi +X(θ) + c
Differentiating both sides of the expression above, we findG′(θ) = X ′(θ) [1− θρ(X(θ))pi].
Since X ′AS(θ) > 0, and since XAS(θ) > x(θ) implies 1−θρ(X(θ))pi > 0, it holds
that G′(θ) > 0. We can also write: G′(θ) − X ′(θ) = −θρ(X(θ))X ′(θ) < 0.
Since G(θ′′) = X(θ′′) and G′(θ) < X ′(θ) for θ > θ′′, this means X(θ) > G(θ)
for θ > θ′′.
Proof of Proposition 6
As an immediate consequence of Lemma B.4, the investment/prize schedules
given in the proposition solve the problem [P ′]. It remains to be shown that
these schedules also solve [P ], and that the grant schedule satisfies the stated
properties. These proofs follow along similar lines as the proof of Case i in the
49
proof of Proposition 5 (Part II), and so we omit these here.
Proof of Proposition 7
We first show that the investment schedule XAS(θ) can be implemented via a
menu of linear grant contracts {a(θ), r(θ)}θ∈Θ, where the grant is then given
by,
G˜(x, θ) = a(θ) + r(θ)x
Define
a(θ) ≡ G(θ)− r(θ)XAS(θ)
Where G(·) is the optimal grant schedule given in Proposition 4(1), and fully
characterized in Proposition 3. Define r(θ) as follows:
r(θ) ≡ 1− θρ′(XAS(θ))pi
As ρ′ > 0, it is clear that r(·) < 1; moreover, XAS(θ) > x(θ) implies r(·) > 0.
Let u˜(x, θˆ|θ) denote the payoff to a type θ researcher who chooses the contract
{a(θˆ), r(θˆ)}, and invests x:
u˜(x, θˆ|θ) = θρ(x)pi − x− c+ a(θˆ) + r(θˆ)x
The researcher solves, maxx,θˆ{u˜(x, θˆ|θ)}. Let (x∗, θ∗) denote the solution to
the first-order conditions of the researcher’s problem. Using the definitions of
a(·) and r(·), the first-order condition with respect to x can be expressed,
∂u˜(x, θˆ|θ)
∂x
|(x,θˆ)=(x∗,θ∗) = θρ′(x∗)pi − θ∗ρ′(XAS(θ∗))pi = 0
The expression above implies θρ′(x∗) = θ∗ρ′(XAS(θ∗)). Next, using the defini-





|(x,θˆ)=(x∗,θ∗) = G′(θ∗)− r(θ)X ′AS(θ∗) + r′(θ∗)(x∗ −XAS(θ∗)) = 0
By definition of r and G, G′(θ∗) − X ′AS(θ∗)r(θ) = G′(θ∗) − X ′AS(θ∗)[1 −




|(x,θˆ)=(x∗,θ∗) = (x∗ −XAS(θ∗))r′(θ∗) = 0
So long as r′(·) 6= 0, the expression above then implies x∗ = XAS(θ∗). We
will now show that r′(θ) > 0. XAS(θ) is defined:
θρ′(XAS(θ))(W + pi)− 1− h(θ)ρ′(XAS(θ))pi = 0









Using the definition of r(·), the expression above yields,




h′(θ)ρ′(XAS(θ)) + h(θ)ρ′′(XAS(θ))X ′AS(θ)
]
Note that as h′(·) < 0, X ′AS(·) > 0, ρ′(·) > 0, and ρ′′(·) < 0, the term
in square brackets is strictly negative. Hence, for all θ, r′(θ) > 0. Then,
the first-order condition with respect to θˆ implies, x∗ = XAS(θ∗). But, as
we’ve already shown, θρ′(x∗) = θ∗ρ′(XAS(θ∗)). Substituting x∗ = XAS(θ∗), we
obtain θρ′(XAS(θ∗)) = θ∗ρ′(XAS(θ∗)) ⇐⇒ θ = θ∗.
For a type-θ researcher, we have shown that (XAS(θ), θ) is the unique so-
lution to the first-order conditions; it still remains to be shown that IR is sat-
isfied: u˜(XAS(θ), θ|θ) ≥ Π(θ), and the the second-order condition is satisfied.
To check IR, it is straightforward to show that the researcher’s optimal payoff,
u˜(XAS(θ), θ|θ) is equal to her equilibrium payoff under the conditions of Propo-
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sition 4(1). Thus, IR is satisfied. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that
the researcher’s second-order conditions are satisfied at (x, θˆ) = (XAS(θ), θ).
Hence, (XAS(θ), θ) is the unique solution to the researcher’s problem.
We now show that for c sufficiently small, a(θ) < 0 for all θ. To see this,
first note that by definition, G(θ) satisfies,
G(θ)−XAS(θ) = −θρ(XAS(θ))pi + c (16)
Using (16) and the definition of a(θ), we obtain
a(θ) = θpi [−ρ(XAS(θ)) +XAS(θ)ρ′(XAS(θ))] + c
Concavity of ρ implies that the term in square brackets is strictly negative.
Hence, if c is sufficiently small, a(θ) < 0. We now show that a′(θ) < 0:
a′(θ) = G′(θ)− r(θ)X ′AS(θ)− r′(θ)XAS(θ)
= −r′(θ)XAS(θ)
< 0
The first equality follows by definition of a(·). The second equality follows
since, as we’ve already shown, G′(θ) = r(θ)X ′AS(θ), and the inequality follows
since r′(θ) > 0.
Now, note that G˜(XAS(θ), θ) = G(θ) > 0; as it is never optimal for the
researcher to report her type and invest in such a way that G˜(x, θ) < 0, we
may consider a truncated grant function, which can also implement the same
allocation:
G˜(x, θ) =
0, a(θ) + r(θ)x ≤ 0a(θ) + r(θ)x, a(θ) + r(θ)x ≥ 0
Letting b(θ) = −a(θ)
r(θ)
, we can equivalently write,
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G˜(x, θ) =
0 x ≤ b(θ)r(θ)(x− b(θ)) x ≥ b(θ)
Using the definitions of a(θ) and r(θ) along with the fact thatG′(θ) = r(θ)X ′AS(θ),
it is straightforward to show that b′(θ) > 0. Moreover, as already shown,
r(θ) > 0 and for c sufficiently small, a(θ) < 0; hence, if c is small, b(θ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
We must first characterize the optimal menu of contracts when the funder






θρ(x(θ))(W − v(θ))f(θ) dθ (17)
Subject to v(θ) ≥ 0, IR and IC. Note that the IC constraints are given by
(IC-F), (IC-S), and (IC-E). The IR constraint is, for all θ,
u(θ) = θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)− c− x(θ) ≥ Π(θ) = 0
Note that as Π(θ) = 0 (by assumption), for any investment schedule, x(·),
Π(x(θ), 1, θ) ≤ Π(θ) = 0, where Π(·) is as defined in Section 3. More-
over, note that we can equivalently write the IR constraint, Π(x(θ), 1, θ) +
ρ(x(θ))v(θ) ≥ 0. Thus, IR implies v(θ) ≥ 0. Further, the IR constraint im-
plies θρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) − c ≥ x(θ) ≥ 0, and hence (IC-E) is satisfied. Thus,
the only relevant IC constraints are (IC-F) and (IC-S).
Also note that since the funder’s payoff is decreasing in u(·), and (IC-F)
implies u′(·) ≥ 0, optimality implies u(θ) = 0. Next, note that (IC-F) can also
be written, u1(θˆ|θ)|θˆ=θ = 0:
d
dθˆ





[ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi)] =
x′(θ)
θ
The expression above implies that (IC-S) is satisfied if and only if x′(·) ≥ 0.
Next, using the definition of u(θ), we can write:
v(θ) ≡ u(θ) + x(θ) + c
θρ(x(θ))
− pi (18)
Substituting (18) into (IC-F), we can express (IC-F) as follows:
u′(θ) = ρ(x(θ))(v(θ) + pi) =
u(θ) + x(θ) + c
θ
(IC-FP)
Solving the differential equation given by (IC-FP) with initial condition































(x(θ) + c) dθ =
∫ θ
θ
h˜(θ)(x(θ) + c)f(θ) dθ
(19)
Finally, replacing v(·) in the funder’s problem by the expression given in





[θρ(x(θ))(W + pi)− x(θ)− c− h˜(θ)(x(θ) + c)]f(θ) dθ (20)
Subject to x′(θ) ≥ 0. For the moment, we ignore this constraint; we will show
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that it is satisfied if h˜′(·) < 0. Let Xp(·) denote the solution to the funder’s
problem. Pointwise maximization of the maximand in (20) yields the following
first-order condition for each θ ∈ Θ:
θρ′(Xp(θ))(W + pi)− 1− h˜(θ) = 0
Differentiating the first-order condition above with respect to θ, it is straight-
forward to show that if h˜′(·) < 0 then X ′p(·) > 0 and hence (IC-S) is satisfied.
We are now able to prove the proposition. Note that under the hypotheses
of Proposition 4(1), the optimal grant-based funding scheme is in fact the










θρ(Xp(θ))(W + pi)−Xp(θ)− c− h˜(θ)(Xp(θ) + c)
]
f(θ) dθ















h˜(θ)f(θ) dθ > 0
Proof of Proposition 9
First, applying the implicit function theorem on the definitions of XFB(θ) and
XAS(θ), it is straightforward to show
∂XFB(θ)
∂pi
> 0 and ∂XAS(θ)
∂pi
> 0 ⇐⇒ θ >
h(θ). To establish (iii), we apply the envelope theorem to the funder’s relaxed







[ρ(X(θ))(θ − h(θ)) + µ1(θ)θρ(X(θ))] f(θ) dθ






ρ(X(θ))[θ − h(θ)]f(θ) dθ (21)
We will show that the RHS of (21) is strictly positive. Note that since
h′(·) < 0, the term, [θ−h(θ)], is strictly increasing in θ with θ−h(θ) = θ > 0.
So, there are two cases to consider: If [θ− h(θ)] > 0 then [θ− h(θ)] > 0 for all
θ, and part (iii) of the proposition follows immediately. The other possibility
is that [θ − h(θ)] < 0 for θ ∈ [θ, θ∗), and [θ − h(θ)] > 0 for θ ∈ (θ∗, θ), where






ρ(X(θ))(θ − h(θ))f(θ) dθ +
∫ θ
θ∗




ρ(X(θ∗))(θ − h(θ))f(θ) dθ +
∫ θ
θ∗




(θ − h(θ))f(θ) dθ
The strict inequality holds since [θ − h(θ)] < 0 for θ ∈ [θ, θ∗], [θ − h(θ)] > 0
for θ ∈ [θ∗, θ], and since X(·) is non decreasing, and strictly increasing for θ
sufficiently close to θ. Therefore, the first term in the first line is no less than
the corresponding term in the second line, while the second term is strictly


























= θ > 0








(θ − h(θ))f(θ) dθ = ρ(XAS(θ∗))θ > 0.
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